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SIDESTEPPING LIMITED LIABILITY IN CORPORATE 
GROUPS USING THE TORT OF INTERFERENCE WITH 
CONTRACT 
PETER EDMUNDSON∗ 
[This article examines the tort of interference with contract. In particular it analyses the application 
of the tort to a holding company that ‘starves’ its subsidiary of funds. In this context the tort provides 
a potential mechanism to ‘sidestep’ the principle of limited liability. The elements of the tort are 
highly malleable and the tort is prone to expansion. Such expansion could erode the benefits of 
limited liability. For this reason the application of the tort in this context should be constrained with 
reference to the justifications of limited liability and courts should be reluctant to allow its 
application by a voluntary creditor who had other available mechanisms to protect their interests.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the tort of interference with contract.1 It does so in the 
context of a potential claim by a third party against a holding company where the 
third party has contracted with a subsidiary of that holding company. 2  In 
 
 ∗ BJuris, LLB (UNSW), LLM (Syd); Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Economics and Business, The 
University of Sydney. 
 1 The tort has been referred to as the tort of ‘inducing breach of contract’ and similar. However, 
the tort may be committed even where there is inducement or procurement of actions that fall 
short of breach: see Torquay Hotel Ltd v Cousins [1969] 2 Ch 106, 138 (Lord Denning MR); 
Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 26, 43 
(Lindgren J) (‘Allstate Life Insurance’); OBG Ltd v Allan [2005] QB 762, 775–6 (Peter Gib-
son LJ); John Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th ed, 1998) 757; R P Balkin and J L R Davis, Law of 
Torts (3rd ed, 2004) 639. It is for this reason that the term ‘interference with contract’ is prefer-
able. 
 2 This analysis presumes that the subsidiary is wholly owned. However, the application of the tort 
is not necessarily restricted by any particular level of formal control or ownership. 
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particular, this analysis contemplates the application of the tort where a holding 
company ‘starves’ its subsidiary of funds, with the effect that the subsidiary is 
unable to perform its contractual obligations to the third party.3 
Analysis of this matter is both timely and important. Recently there has been 
renewed focus on the ability of holding companies to distance themselves from 
the obligations of their subsidiaries.4 Also, the recent High Court decision in 
Zhu v Treasurer (NSW)5 has highlighted the application of the tort of interference 
with contract to commercial dealings and has demonstrated a divergence from 
the law in England. Discussion of the application of the tort to holding compa-
nies allows analysis of these issues and reveals the complexities of their interac-
tion. It also illustrates the potential for the tort to apply in a manner that ‘side-
steps’ the principle of limited liability in corporate groups. 
The analysis below first places the issue of holding company liability for 
interference with a subsidiary’s contracts in the context of the limited liability of 
such a company for the debts of its subsidiary. This is followed by a discussion 
of the English case of Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [No 3],6 a 
recent Court of Appeal decision that illustrates the potential use of the tort 
against a holding company. Following this, there is a more detailed critical 
analysis of the elements of the tort in Australia, with a particular focus on the 
intricacies of those elements when there is a claim based on the ‘starvation’ of a 
subsidiary of funds. Finally, there is a discussion of whether a broad or narrow 
approach towards the scope of the tort should be taken in the case of corporate 
groups. 
I I   LIMITED LIABILITY AND CORPORATE GROUPS 
The issue of holding company liability for interference with a subsidiary’s 
contract must be seen against the backdrop of two overlapping concepts that are 
the central legal features of corporate groups: the fact that corporations in groups 
are treated as separate juridical persons and the fact that limited liability applies 
to the constituent corporations in a group. These features, although subject to 
 
 3 It is not the aim of this article to argue in relation to the value or desirability of the tort generally. 
There is a significant quantity of literature on this issue, including much based on the ‘efficient 
breach theory’. Some of this literature critiques the tort based on the notion that it interferes with 
what would otherwise be ‘efficient’ breaches of contract. Other literature attempts to reconcile 
efficient breach theory with the tort. For a useful review of the literature see Fred S McChesney, 
‘Tortious Interference with Contract versus “Efficient” Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence’ 
(1999) 28 Journal of Legal Studies 131, 134–43. At the risk of falling foul of what McChesney 
identifies at 186 as the ‘methodological shortcomings’ of the ‘standard mode of legal rhetoric’ 
this article leaves for another day economic and empirical analysis of the tort in the corporate 
group context. 
 4 Evidence of this revived interest can be found in the report on transactions undertaken by 
members of the James Hardie group of companies that affected the ability of tort victims to 
recover for their losses: D F Jackson, Special Commission of Inquiry into the Medical Research 
and Compensation Foundation, Report of the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Medical 
Research and Compensation Foundation (2004). However, it should be noted that the facts that 
gave rise to this report may not be appropriate for the application of the tort, as the relevant 
underlying obligations arose in negligence rather than contract. 
 5 (2004) 218 CLR 530 (‘Zhu’). 
 6 [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768 (‘Stocznia Gdanska’). 
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some limited exceptions,7 give rise to the possibility that a holding company 
may, with limited risk of liability, allow one of its subsidiaries to ‘wither on the 
vine’ by refusing to provide the subsidiary with sufficient funds to operate. The 
problem was aptly described in the English context in Re Southard & Co Ltd by 
Templeman LJ, who stated: 
English company law possesses some curious features, which may generate cu-
rious results. A parent company may spawn a number of subsidiary companies, 
all controlled directly or indirectly by the shareholders of the parent company. 
If one of the subsidiary companies, to change the metaphor, turns out to be the 
runt of the litter and declines into insolvency to the dismay of its creditors, the 
parent company and the other subsidiary companies may prosper to the joy of 
the shareholders without any liability for the debts of the insolvent subsidiary.8 
Where this occurs and losses are left with a subsidiary, it may be that the 
holding company has ‘externalised’ risks while still taking rewards from its 
subsidiary.9 However, if interference with contract provides a remedy against a 
holding company to a party contracting with a subsidiary, this may allow an 
important route to ‘sidestep’ the principle of limited liability. This in itself 
provides significant justification for an examination of the limits of the tort in 
this context. The tort is not alone in this regard and the ‘sidestepping’ of the 
principle of limited liability can be observed in the context of a number of other 
potential actions against holding companies.10 The fact that the tort may join a 
developing range of paths around the corporate veil reinforces the importance of 
its examination. 
I I I   AN ILLUSTRATION OF  THE TORT IN  A CORPORATE GROUP 
CONTEXT:  STOCZNIA GDANSKA 
The application of the tort in a corporate group context can be observed in the 
case of Stocznia Gdanska.11 In the case, the Latvian Shipping Company (‘Lat-
vian Shipping’) negotiated for the manufacture and purchase of a number of 
vessels from Stocznia Gdanska SA (‘Stocznia’). 12  The negotiations were 
conducted on the basis that the ultimate purchaser was to be a company nomi-
nated by Latmar Holdings Corporation (‘Latmar’), a subsidiary of Latvian 
 
 7 The courts may lift the corporate veil to impose liability on a holding company, although such 
decisions are ‘occasional’ and unpredictable: Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (1989) 16 
NSWLR 549, 567 (Rogers AJA). Statutory provisions may also impose liability on a holding 
company, most notably Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588V. See below Part IV. 
 8 [1979] 3 All ER 556, 565. Note that this statement might be updated with reference to some 
exceptions: see especially Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588V. 
 9 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1879, 1883. 
 10 For discussion in the context of the tort of negligence, see Peter Edmundson and Pam Stewart, 
‘Liability of a Holding Company for Negligent Injuries to an Employee of a Subsidiary: 
CSR v Wren’ (1998) 6 Torts Law Journal 123. For discussion in the context of actions for ‘know-
ing receipt’, see Peter Edmundson and James Mitchell, ‘Knowing Receipt in Corporate Group 
Structures’ (2005) 23 Company and Securities Law Journal 515. 
 11 [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768. 
 12 Ibid 773 (Rix LJ). 
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Shipping.13 When negotiations reached their final stages, Stocznia was informed 
that the purchaser was to be Latreefers Inc (‘Latreefers’), a company that was to 
be a wholly owned subsidiary of Latmar.14 Stocznia did not seek a guarantee of 
Latreefers’ performance from either Latvian Shipping or Latmar (although there 
was evidence that Latvian Shipping would have given such a guarantee if 
pressed).15 
Latreefers was incorporated a few days before the contracts for the manufac-
ture and supply of the vessels were entered into.16 While the shares in Latreefers 
were held by Latmar, the directors of Latreefers were employees of a service 
company called Capco Trust (Isle of Man) Ltd (‘Capco’), which was connected 
with a firm of solicitors on the Isle of Man. Capco and Latvian Shipping had 
entered into a contract that provided that Latreefers would ‘be kept in sufficient 
funds by [Latvian Shipping] to honour its liabilities as and when they become 
due’.17 
The contracts required the provision of six vessels (once certain options had 
been exercised) and the general structure of the consideration was the same in 
relation to each vessel.18 A payment of five per cent of the total price was due on 
signing, to be followed by 20 per cent on the laying of the keel, 25 per cent upon 
launch and the remaining 50 per cent upon delivery. The five per cent deposit 
was paid in each case. Unfortunately, the market for the charter of the vessels 
(and hence the commercial value of the vessels) collapsed and it was suggested 
that, from the perspective of Latreefers, this made the contracts ‘economically 
unrealistic.’19 There was evidence that Latreefers, if unsupported by its holding 
companies, would not have been able to raise sufficient funds to pay for the 
vessels.20 
Notice was given to Latreefers that the 20 per cent keel laying deposit was due 
for the first21 and second22 vessels. No payment was made. Stocznia gave notices 
of rescission in respect of these two contracts. Stocznia then purported to 
appropriate the keels laid for the first two vessels to the contracts for the third 
and fourth vessels and issued ‘keel laying notices’ in relation to these.23 Again, 
the keel laying deposits were unpaid and notices of rescission were issued by 
Stocznia. A similar process ensued in respect of the contracts for the fifth and 
sixth vessels.24 
As Latreefers was unfunded, any remedies against it would have proved hol-
low. Therefore, Stocznia brought a number of claims including one against 
 
 13 Ibid. 
 14 Ibid 773–4 (Rix LJ). 
 15 Ibid 774. 
 16 Ibid. 
 17 Ibid. 
 18 Ibid. 
 19 Ibid 775 (Rix LJ). 
 20 Ibid 774 (Rix LJ). 
 21 Ibid 776 (Rix LJ). 
 22 Ibid 777 (Rix LJ). 
 23 Ibid. 
 24 Ibid. 
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Latvian Shipping on the basis that Latvian Shipping had induced Latreefers’ 
breach of contract. It was found at trial that Latvian Shipping had not directly 
induced Latreefers to breach its contract with Stocznia as Latvian Shipping had 
not specifically told Latreefers’ directors not to pay the relevant instalments.25 
However, the trial judge, Thomas J, was satisfied that the task of raising finance 
for the vessels was the responsibility of Latvian Shipping and not of Latreefers, 
that Latvian Shipping had instructed Latreefers that it did not intend to provide 
funds for the instalments (at the time of the keel laying notices) and that Latreef-
ers was told to do nothing to respond to the notices.26 Thomas J further found 
that this was a deliberate breach of the agreement that Latvian Shipping had with 
Capco to keep Latreefers in sufficient funds and that the objective of refusing to 
fund Latreefers was to prevent it performing its contract with Stocznia.27 On this 
basis it was found at first instance that Latvian Shipping was liable to Stocznia 
for indirectly inducing a breach of contract by Latreefers.28 
Several issues were considered on appeal. In relation to the actions in tort, 
Rix LJ (with Tuckey and Aldous LJJ agreeing) found that the trial judge’s 
decision that there was no liability for direct inducement of breach should not be 
disturbed.29 However, Latvian Shipping was liable for ‘indirect inducement by 
unlawful means of Latreefers’ breaches of its contracts’.30 Rix LJ stated that the 
tort is committed where ‘a defendant wrongly, that is to say, by unlawful means, 
withholds that which is necessary to another party to fulfil his contract with a 
claimant, and does so with the requisite knowledge of that contract and with the 
requisite intention.’31 
Therefore, the withholding of funds by Latvian Shipping, in breach of the 
agreement between Latvian Shipping and Capco to keep Latreefers in funds, 
with the intention that this was to cause Latreefers to fail to perform its contracts, 
entitled Stocznia to a remedy in tort. 
The reasoning in this case will be examined in more detail below;32 however, 
the outline above demonstrates the potential use of the tort against a holding 
company. While resort to the tort was necessary only because of the curious fact 
that Stocznia did not request a parent company guarantee,33 the usefulness of the 
 
 25 Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 537, 574–7 (Thomas J). 
 26 Ibid 572, 574. 
 27 Ibid 574–7. 
 28 Ibid 581–2 (Thomas J). In addition to the claims based on the tort of inducing breach of contract, 
a series of complex claims in relation to contract (including breach and rescission) was made: 
Stocznia Gdanska [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 783–96 (Rix LJ). While a number of interesting 
issues arose, it is not necessary to delve into these matters for the purposes of this article. For 
discussion of some of these issues see J W Carter, ‘Shipbuilding Contracts: The Interaction of 
Contractual Rights and Common Law Remedies’ (1997) 12 Journal of Contract Law 65; J W 
Carter, ‘Shipbuilding Contracts: Take 2’ (1998) 12 Journal of Contract Law 247; J W Carter, 
‘Shipbuilding Contracts: Not Quite the Final Chapter’ (1998) 13 Journal of Contract Law 156. 
 29 Stocznia Gdanska [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 797–8. 
 30 Ibid 803 (Rix LJ). 
 31 Ibid 799. 
 32 See below Parts V(C), VI. 
 33 This could be partly due to the fact that, in the negotiation of the arrangement, Stocznia did not 
seek legal advice: Stocznia Gdanska [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 773 (Rix LJ). 
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claim for the contracting party is clear: it allowed Stocznia to look beyond the 
insolvent party with whom it had contracted towards a better funded target. 
IV  DOES THE TORT PROVIDE A POTENTIALLY USEFUL REMEDY IN  
AUSTRALIA? 
Whether the tort is potentially useful to a plaintiff in Australia depends upon 
whether it can operate in circumstances that do not give rise to a remedy by some 
other mechanism or, in areas of overlap with other remedies, whether the tort 
provides a procedural or tactical advantage. There would be limited practical role 
for the tort in the context contemplated if it did nothing beyond what might be 
achieved through the insolvent trading provisions in Part 5.7B of the Corpora-
tions Act 2001 (Cth) or by means such as lifting the corporate veil. In certain 
cases the tort may find application when Part 5.7B might not and, in other cases, 
the tort may provide practical advantages for a creditor even if there may be 
potential liability under Part 5.7B. The potential advantages of pursuing the 
tortious remedy (if available) include, but are not limited to: 
• the fact that breach of s 588V gives rise to an action by the liquidator of the 
subsidiary, rather than by individual creditors, with the result that the pro-
ceeds of such an action may be pooled. However, a claim in tort by a creditor 
would be for its benefit alone;34 
• the fact that a number of defences may apply in relation to a claim under the 
insolvent trading provisions;35  
• the fact that tortious liability does not rely upon the demonstration of 
insolvency at any particular point in time;36 and 
• the fact that it is not necessary to determine when the subsidiary incurred a 
debt.37 Where the subsidiary has contracted for the purchase of significant 
items, such as in Stocznia Gdanska, difficult issues may arise in determining 
when any debt is incurred. The time at which a debt is incurred depends upon 
the facts and the context of enquiry.38 It has been suggested that in some 
 
 34 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588W. Note that under equivalent provisions that apply to 
the liability of directors in s 588G a creditor may have a direct action: s 588M(3), pt 5.7B 
div 4(B). This may provide a creditor of a subsidiary some utility in arguing that the holding 
company was a shadow director of the subsidiary and that liability arises under s 588G, although 
the difficulty of demonstrating that a company is a shadow director should not be underesti-
mated. 
 35 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588X. For a recent discussion of these defences in the context of 
analogous provisions in s 588H, see David B Goldman, ‘Directors Beware! Creditor Protection 
from Insolvent Trading’ (2005) 23 Company and Securities Law Journal 216. 
 36 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588V(1)(b). Unless the case falls within circumstances listed 
in s 588E, in which insolvency can be presumed subject to rebuttal, the demonstration of insol-
vency can be complex and involve practical difficulties: see generally Kerri Eagle, ‘Evidentiary 
Issues in Proving Insolvency’ (1999) 7 Insolvency Law Journal 196. 
 37 The time at which the debt is incurred must coincide with the existence of the holding  
company–subsidiary relationship (Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588V(1)(a)), the insolvency of 
the subsidiary (s 588V(1)(b)), the existence of reasonable grounds to suspect insolvency 
(s 588V(1)(c)) and, where applicable, the awareness of the holding company or its directors of 
such grounds (s 588V(1)(d)). 
 38 Hawkins v Bank of China (1992) 26 NSWLR 562, 567–8, 572 (Gleeson CJ). 
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situations a debt will be incurred by a purchaser at the time of delivery and 
invoice and in other situations the debt will be incurred at the time of con-
tract.39 Pursuit of the action in tort means that such matters do not need to be 
addressed. 
Obviously, in other respects, Part 5.7B provides much broader coverage than 
the tort, and the tort is not in any danger of usurping the function of these 
statutory provisions.40 However, it appears that the tort may provide a remedy 
for a creditor in at least some situations where Part 5.7B may not. 
Similarly, the tort would not provide a significant remedy if it had no operation 
beyond other available routes to holding company liability, such as lifting the 
veil at common law. It often is said that the courts may lift the veil of incorpora-
tion in a number of circumstances, including where there is fraud, or where the 
corporation is held to be an agent of another party.41 
The cases on fraud typically revolve around fraudulent incorporation, or the 
formation of a corporation with the sole or dominant purpose of avoiding a 
pre-existing legal obligation.42 The facts of Stocznia Gdanska clearly demon-
strate that the tort is not so confined. In that case the intention to induce breach 
of contract by letting the subsidiary ‘starve’ apparently arose after the incorpora-
tion of the subsidiary. In such a case it is very unlikely that a court would lift the 
veil on the basis of fraud. 
Holding company liability may also flow from a finding that the activities of a 
subsidiary were carried on by the subsidiary as an agent of the holding company. 
The most familiar case in which this occurred is Smith, Stone & Knight 
Ltd v City of Birmingham.43 While unusual for the fact that it is not a case on 
holding company liability,44 it has been suggested that a key reason for the 
 
 39 See Hodgson J’s comments in Leigh-Mardon Pty Ltd v Wawn (1995) 13 ACLC 1244, 1248, 
which suggest that the date of contract might be appropriate in relation to goods that were manu-
factured especially for the purchaser and were not readily saleable elsewhere, such that a refusal 
to take delivery would give rise to a damages claim approximating the value of the goods. See 
also references to this case in Credit Co Pty Ltd v Atkins (1999) 17 ACLC 756, 768–9 
(O’Loughlin J) and discussion of the issue in John Mosley, ‘Insolvent Trading: What Is a Debt 
and When Is One Incurred?’ (1996) 4 Insolvency Law Journal 155; Goldman, above n 35, 219; 
Paul James, Ian Ramsay and Polat Siva, ‘Insolvent Trading — An Empirical Study’ (2004) 12 
Insolvency Law Journal 210, 212–13. 
 40 Obvious differences include the fact that an action pursuant to a contravention of the Corpora-
tions Act 2001 (Cth) s 588V does not require there to be any ‘intention’ on the part of the hold-
ing company or its directors, and that the section has potential application in relation to debts 
other than contract debts. Further, the tort is concerned with how a breach came about (and 
related matters of causation), whereas pt 5.7B is not directly concerned with how the debt was 
incurred. 
 41 R P Austin and I M Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (12th ed, 2005) 126. Of 
course, the finding of agency between a company and its shareholders assumes the separate 
nature of shareholder and company rather than disregards it. On this basis it can only be de-
scribed as lifting the veil in a very general sense. 
 42 See Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 All ER 442; Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935. If the 
relevant corporation in Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne had been formed by a third party before 
the intention to defeat the existing obligation then the veil would not be lifted: Austin and Ram-
say, above n 41, 127. Austin and Ramsay specifically contemplate that the tort of interference 
with contractual relations may apply on those facts: at 127–8. 
 43 [1939] 4 All ER 116 (‘Smith, Stone & Knight’). 
 44 In fact it was the holding company that was arguing for a finding that agency existed, in order to 
fall within a statutory compensation regime: ibid 118 (Atkinson J). 
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finding of agency was the fact that the subsidiary was not given sufficient 
resources by its holding company.45 While the case has been applied in Austra-
lia,46 its value as a precedent has been questioned for some time.47 Further, the 
case falls a long way short of a general rule that the holding company of an 
under-funded subsidiary will become liable for the subsidiary’s debts on the 
basis of agency.48 In the absence of other factors indicating an agency relation-
ship, the mere starvation of a subsidiary of funds with the intention of causing 
the subsidiary to be unable to perform a contract should not give rise to the 
lifting of the veil based on the principles found in cases such as Smith, Stone & 
Knight. 
What appears from the discussion above is that, in finding application well 
outside its origins in labour law,49 the tort provides a potentially useful means by 
which a creditor of a subsidiary may seek remedy against a solvent holding 
company.50 
V  AN EXAMINATION OF  THE TORT IN  AUSTRALIA 
The discussion above demonstrates the potential usefulness of the tort in a 
corporate group context and provides an example of such use in England. 
Analysis now turns to more detailed discussion of the elements of the tort as it 
has developed in Australia, in order to explore the limits of the tort and any 
ambiguities that may arise from its domestic application against a holding 
company. However, before these elements are explored, it is appropriate to 
reflect briefly upon the general basis of any holding company liability. 
 
 45 Austin and Ramsay, above n 41, 130. 
 46 Spreag v Paeson Pty Ltd (1990) 94 ALR 679, 711 (Sheppard J). 
 47 See, eg, Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry; Re International Tin 
Council [1988] 3 All ER 523, 310–11 (Kerr LJ). 
 48 In order to determine whether or not a business is merely carried on by a subsidiary as an agent, 
Atkinson J poses six questions, all of which must be answered in the affirmative. While not 
stating explicitly that undercapitalisation is a key factor, one of the six questions is ‘did the 
[parent] company govern the adventure, decide what should be done and what capital should be 
embarked on the venture?’: Smith, Stone & Knight [1939] 4 All ER 116, 121. 
 49 The modern tort can be said to flow from the case of Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216; 118 ER 
749 in which it was accepted for the first time that the principles behind remedies for ‘poaching’ 
the employment of servants extended to broader contractual obligations (in Lumley v Gye, the 
services of an opera singer not under an employment contract). For a fascinating account of the 
events leading to Lumley v Gye, see S M Waddams, ‘Johanna Wagner and the Rival Opera 
Houses’ (2001) 117 Law Quarterly Review 431, 431–40. Waddams is critical of the spread of the 
tort so far outside its original context: at 452–4. It has been suggested that around 60 per cent of 
cases have been in the employment context: David Howarth, ‘Against Lumley v Gye’ (2005) 68 
Modern Law Review 195, 196–7. It has also been stated that recently the application of the tort 
to more general commercial dealings has increased: Michael Izzo, ‘The Limits of Lumley v Gye: 
Commercial Disputes and the Tort of Interference with Contractual Relations’ (2005) 13 Torts 
Law Journal 188, 188. 
 50 In the case of LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 74 
(Unreported, Meagher, Hodgson JJA and Young CJ in Eq, 10 April 2003) [21] (‘LMI Australasia 
Appeal’), Young CJ in Eq provides an example of a claim against a company for breach of 
contract that would be commercially frustrated by the fact that it was a ‘$2 company’ and an 
attempt to overcome this by bringing an action against related solvent companies for inducing 
the alleged breach. 
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A  The Basis of Holding Company Liability 
The fact that a holding company, like any company, is an artificial legal entity 
and can only act through natural persons presents some initial issues. The first of 
these involves whether or how the liability of the holding company is to be 
separated from the potential liability of those natural persons.51 
It is clear from the case law that, in the simple situation of breach of contract 
by a corporation, the directors of that corporation will not be liable for inducing 
that breach.52 This principle has been said to flow from the High Court’s analysis 
of the tort of conspiracy in O’Brien v Dawson. 53  The rationale behind this 
principle is that, assuming the director is acting within their authority, they are 
acting ‘as’ the corporation and their actions should not be separated from those 
of the corporation.54 In other words, the tort must be committed by a third party 
and this third party ‘cannot be the alter ego of one of the parties to the con-
tract’.55 This leaves any corporate liability for the tort as primary rather than 
vicarious, at least in the case of actions by directors. The same reasoning should 
be applied in relation to the acts of holding companies. Any liability should rest 
with the holding company itself rather than with the directors of the holding 
company. 
A second issue is whether holding company liability should be precluded on 
the basis of the principle in O’Brien v Dawson. 56  In LMI Australasia Pty 
Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd, Barrett J, in obiter, stated that on the 
facts of the case it could not be said that the holding company had interfered 
with the subsidiary’s contracts.57 Instead the relevant decision to interfere was 
made by the subsidiary, ‘but that decision proceeds from an exercise of the 
holding company’s will within and through the subsidiary, rather than upon it.’58 
In other words, the holding company ‘[was] not in the position of an outsider 
influencing the independent volition of the subsidiary.’59 On this basis Barrett J 
found that the tort could not apply to the holding company, essentially for lack of 
interference by a third party. 
 
 51 Such natural persons typically will be appointed directors of the company. However, a company 
can act through a range of persons including directors (whether or not validly appointed), offi-
cers and other authorised parties. 
 52 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 328 (Unreported, Einstein J, 2 
May 2001) [29]. 
 53 (1942) 66 CLR 18. See Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 328 
(Unreported, Einstein J, 2 May 2001) [13]–[29]. For a discussion of this matter, see Izzo, 
above n 49, 193–5. For discussion of the similar finding in Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497, see 
Howarth, above n 49, 226. 
 54 O’Brien v Dawson (1942) 66 CLR 18, 32 (Starke J); see also Izzo, above n 49, 194. 
 55 Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 328 (Unreported, Einstein J, 2 
May 2001) [17]. 
 56 See Izzo, above n 49, 195–7. 
 57 (2002) 18 BCL 57, 77 (New South Wales Supreme Court) (‘LMI Australasia First Instance’). 
 58 Ibid. 
 59 Ibid. 
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On appeal, Young CJ in Eq disagreed with this approach,60 arguing that it 
relied upon a ‘completely imperfect’ 61  analogy between the position of the 
director of a corporation and the position of a holding company. The approach 
assumes that the rule in O’Brien v Dawson is based merely on the notion that the 
corporation has not exercised an independent mind, rather than on the different 
matter of the consequences of acting or thinking through an agent or director.62 
Just as it cannot be presumed that a subsidiary is an agent of its holding com-
pany,63 it cannot be presumed that when a holding company makes a decision in 
relation to the affairs of its subsidiary it does so as agent of the subsidiary or 
acting ‘as’ the subsidiary.64 Instead, the better approach is to respect the separate 
nature of the holding company and its subsidiary; the rule that protects directors 
from a legal action for interference with contracts by their company should not 
extend generally to prevent holding companies being liable for interference with 
their subsidiaries’ contracts.65 As was pointed out by Young CJ in Eq, to find 
otherwise would risk ‘the avoidance of contracts by the simple expedient of 
acting via [a] subsidiary’.66 Such an approach is consistent with the English 
cases in which the courts have been untroubled in finding that a controlling 
parent company can interfere with the contracts of its subsidiaries.67 
B  The Mental Element: Knowledge and Intention 
As an initial matter, for the tort to apply the defendant holding company must 
have some knowledge of the relevant contract.68 It must also be the case that the 
defendant holding company intended to interfere with the contract.69 It is clear 
 
 60 LMI Australasia Appeal [2003] NSWCA 74 (Unreported, Meagher, Hodgson JJA and 
Young CJ in Eq, 10 April 2003) [94]. Indeed, Young CJ in Eq firmly rejects the analysis, stating 
that ‘one must not allow nice sounding fuzzy dicta to take the place of proper analysis’: at [97]. 
However, the case is not the strongest precedent: see Biscayne Partners Pty Ltd v Valance Co 
Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 874 (Unreported, Einstein J, 3 October 2003) [111], where Einstein J, in 
referring to the Court of Appeal decision, stated: ‘there are difficulties with discerning a com-
mon holding as between the three judges sitting’. 
 61 LMI Australasia Appeal [2003] NSWCA 74 (Unreported, Meagher, Hodgson JJA and 
Young CJ in Eq, 10 April 2003) [97]. 
 62 Ibid [94]–[95] (Young CJ in Eq). 
 63 Smith, Stone & Knight [1939] 4 All ER 116, 121 (Atkinson J). 
 64 Although this raises the difficult conceptual issue of whether a holding company that has 
sufficient control to make it a ‘shadow director’ of its subsidiary should be treated as acting and 
thinking ‘as’ its subsidiary in the sense explored in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] 
AC 153. 
 65 Izzo, above n 49, 201. 
 66 LMI Australasia Appeal [2003] NSWCA 74 (Unreported, Meagher, Hodgson JJA and 
Young CJ in Eq, 10 April 2003) [98]. 
 67 See, eg, Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Kingswood Motors (Addleston) Ltd [1973] 3 All ER 1057, 
1068 (Bridge J); Stocznia Gdanska [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 798 (Rix LJ). 
 68 Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329, 338 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ); 
Independent Oil Industries Ltd v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 394, 415 (Jor-
dan CJ) (‘Independent Oil Industries’). 
 69 Allstate Life Insurance (1995) 58 FCR 26, 43 (Lindgren J); Fightvision Pty Ltd v Onisforou 
(1999) 47 NSWLR 473, 512 (Sheller, Stein and Giles JJA) (‘Fightvision’). In an interesting 
recent English decision, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the tort would not be committed 
where there was an intention to interfere with the right of a party to manage their contractual 
affairs (in that case by the defective appointment of a receiver), but no intention to interfere with 
the performance of a contract: OBG Ltd v Allan [2005] QB 762, 775 (Peter Gibson LJ), 799 
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that malicious intention is not required.70 However, the tort cannot be committed 
through mere negligence.71 
Some recent Australian cases demonstrate that the requirements of knowledge 
and intention are bound together and should not be seen as separate ‘elements’ of 
the tort. In Allstate Life Insurance Lindgren J (with Lockhart and Tamberlin JJ 
agreeing) stated: 
Linguistic confusion can arise in respect of the alleged tortfeasor’s state of 
mind with respect to breach of the contract. Both ‘intention’ and ‘knowledge’ 
have been used in this context. But a person’s ‘knowledge’ that what he is in-
ducing will constitute a breach of contract and his ‘intention’ to induce a breach 
of contract by what he is doing refer to one and the same thing. After all, ex 
hypothesi, the alleged tortfeasor’s acts are intentional, a breach of contract oc-
curs, and the acts induce the breach. Against that background, ‘knowledge’ and 
‘intention’ that the breach will result from the acts do not signify any relevant 
distinction.72 
Further, Lindgren J stated: 
the authorities establish conclusively that the gravamen of the tort is intention. 
Although the requirement of knowledge of the contract is sometimes discussed 
as if it was a separate ingredient of the tort, it is in fact an aspect of intention. 
The requirement that the alleged tortfeasor have ‘sufficient knowledge of the 
contract’ is a requirement he have sufficient knowledge to ground an intention 
to interfere with contractual rights.73 
These comments have been cited with approval recently by the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal74 and are consistent with other formulations of the tort 
that describe liability as arising where the defendant acted ‘knowingly and 
intending the breach’75 or where the breach was ‘knowingly procured’.76 
It has long been said that the knowledge of the defendant need not be knowl-
edge of the precise terms of the relevant contract.77 It has also been suggested 
that the courts may assume that knowledge of the contract exists if there is more 
general knowledge of the relevant business of the contracting party.78 In addi-
 
(Carnwath LJ). However, the fragility of this decision is demonstrated by the dissent of 
Mance LJ, and Carnwath LJ’s admission of being ‘torn between’ the differing views of Peter 
Gibson and Mance LJJ: at 799. 
 70 Zhu (2004) 218 CLR 530, 569–70 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ); 
Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied 
Services Union of Australia v Corke Instrument Engineering Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 223 ALR 
480, 485 (Finkelstein J); South Wales Miners’ Federation v Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd [1905] AC 
239, 246 (Lord Macnaghten). 
 71 See Fleming, above n 1, 762; Balkin and Davis, above n 1, 639. 
 72 (1995) 58 FCR 26, 37. 
 73 Ibid 43. 
 74 Fightvision (1999) 47 NSWLR 473, 510–11 (Sheller, Stein and Giles JJA). 
 75 Stocznia Gdanska [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 803 (Rix LJ). 
 76 Fleming, above n 1, 761–2. 
 77 See J T Stratford & Son Ltd v Lindley [1965] AC 269, 332 (Lord Pearce); Boral Bricks NSW Pty 
Ltd v Frost (1987) 20 IR 70, 78 (Brownie J); Australian Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous 
Workers’ Union v Liquorland (Aust) Pty Ltd (2002) 114 IR 165, 179 (Cooper J); Fleming, 
above n 1, 761; Balkin and Davis, above n 1, 641.  
 78 Balkin and Davis, above n 1, 641. 
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tion, if the defendant knew of the existence of a contract, but reasonably believed 
that what was being induced or procured was not a breach of the relevant 
contract or that the alleged contract was no longer binding, the tort would not be 
committed.79 
It is clear that the requirements of intention and knowledge are ‘subjective’.80 
Negligent failure to ascertain the existence of a contract or its terms would not 
alone satisfy the mental requirement of the tort.81 However, wilful blindness or 
reckless indifference might.82 This does not usurp the subjective nature of the 
test as the devices of wilful blindness or recklessness merely provide evidence 
by which the relevant subjective intention can be found.83 It has been suggested 
that this matter is complicated by whether or not the interference is ‘direct’ or 
‘indirect’. R P Balkin and J L R Davis state: 
If the defendant does an act the substantially certain consequence of which is 
directly to bring about a breach of a contract of which he or she is aware, then it 
will be presumed that the breach was intended, and liability will ensue unless 
the presumption is rebutted. An indirect interference with a contract, however, 
must be a necessary consequence of the defendant’s acts …84 
Again, it is submitted that this formulation does not signify a further substan-
tive requirement or element in cases of indirect interference. Rather, it is 
suggested that it merely illustrates an aspect of inferring intention through 
recklessness. In cases of indirect interference it may be difficult to find intention 
through recklessness where the causal link between the defendant’s act and the 
interference is unclear. This is because finding subjective intention through the 
device of recklessness in one sense may rely upon the notion that the more solid 
the causal link between an act and the result of the act, the more likely it is that 
the actor intends to bring about the result.85 
 
 79 Fightvision (1999) 47 NSWLR 473, 509 (Sheller, Stein and Giles JJA). This should follow from 
the fact that in such a case there would not be an intention to induce a breach of contract. Also, 
there would be no liability if, regardless of the defendant’s intentions, there was in fact never a 
valid contract. 
 80 Ibid 511 (Sheller, Stein and Giles JJA), citing Allstate Life Insurance (1995) 58 FCR 26, 43 
(Lindgren J). 
 81 Fightvision (1999) 47 NSWLR 473, 512 (Sheller, Stein and Giles JJA). 
 82 Ibid; Allstate Life Insurance (1995) 58 FCR 26, 37 (Lindgren J). 
 83 Fightvision (1999) 47 NSWLR 473, 510–11 (Sheller, Stein and Giles JJA) and the references 
there to Allstate Life Insurance (1995) 58 FCR 26, 37, 43 (Lindgren J); see also Fleming, 
above n 1, 761–2. 
 84 Balkin and Davis, above n 1, 638–9 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Da-
vies v Nyland (1975) 10 SASR 76, 98 (Bray CJ). Note, however, that in Davies v Nyland the 
proposition is merely dicta and is put on the very conditional basis that ‘[t]here is some sugges-
tion in some of the cases’ to support it: at 98. 
 85 Note, however, that there are limits to this logic and subjective intention cannot be usurped 
completely by such logic. In Gollins v Gollins [1963] 2 All ER 966, 972, Lord Reid pointed out 
that sometimes a person in fact intends something very different from the likely consequences of 
their act. His Lordship stated: 
To take a trivial example, if I say that I intend to reach the green, people will believe me al-
though we all know that the odds are ten to one against my succeeding; and no one but a law-
yer would say that I must be presumed to have intended to put my ball in the bunker, because 
that was the natural and probable result of my shot. 
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In the case of a holding company that ‘starves’ its subsidiary of funds, it would 
have to be shown that the holding company had sufficient knowledge of the 
subsidiary’s contracts to ground the required intention. The company can only 
have such knowledge through natural persons. As a practical matter it is likely 
that the knowledge will be attributed through directors or officers of the holding 
company.86 In the case of significant contracts, there should be little difficulty 
finding evidence to show knowledge of the existence of those contracts in the 
minds of directors of the holding company. In many cases it is likely that some 
of those directors will also be directors of the subsidiary concerned. Only where 
the subsidiary operates completely independently is it likely that there will not be 
knowledge in the holding company of significant contracts. 
Where there is some knowledge of its subsidiary’s contracts, the holding 
company’s act of refusing to place the subsidiary in funds must then be intended 
to prevent performance of those contracts. It is unlikely that the holding com-
pany will, through a director or an agent, expressly state its intention in with-
holding funds. Therefore, the matter is likely to be left to inference. Here much 
will turn upon whether the holding company was aware of the extent of the 
subsidiary’s funding and the extent of its financial obligations under the con-
tracts. The more certain it is that failure to fund the subsidiary would cause it to 
default on a payment under a contract, the more likely it is that the ‘starvation’ of 
the subsidiary was intended to cause such default. 
C  Interference with the Contract 
At its barest this requirement is a simple one: the defendant must interfere in 
some way with the performance of a contract. In early cases this was character-
ised as the requirement to induce or procure breach of the contract.87 However, 
more recent formulations recognise the tort where there has been inducement or 
procurement of a failure to perform contractual obligations in a manner that may 
fall short of a breach that gives rise to an action for damages.88 
A closer examination of the requirement reveals the following potential com-
plexities: 
• whether the tort can be committed by a failure to act; 
• distinguishing between direct and indirect interference; and 
 
In Millar v Bassey [1994] EMLR 44, 62, Peter Gibson LJ emphasised the point in the context of 
the tort by stating: 
it is necessary that [the defendant’s] conduct must have been directed against the plaintiff in 
the sense that the breach of [the plaintiff’s] contract or the interference with [the plaintiff’s] 
interests was intended, rather than being merely what probably would result from [the defen-
dant’s] conduct. 
For a critical analysis of the issue generally, see Anthony Kenny, ‘Intention and Purpose in Law’ 
in Robert Summers (ed), Essays in Legal Philosophy (1970) 146. 
 86 Indeed, sufficient knowledge may remain with a corporation even where the natural person 
through whom knowledge was attributed has resigned as a director or is no longer an employee: 
Fightvision (1999) 47 NSWLR 473, 527 (Sheller, Stein and Giles JJA). 
 87 See, eg, Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216; 118 ER 749. 
 88 Torquay Hotel Ltd v Cousins [1969] 2 Ch 106, 138 (Lord Denning MR); Allstate Life Insurance 
(1995) 58 FCR 26, 43 (Lindgren J); OBG Ltd v Allan [2005] QB 762, 775–6 (Peter Gibson LJ). 
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• where the interference is indirect, determining whether it is relevantly 
unlawful. 
As will be seen, these matters are not conceptually independent of each other. 
However, an attempt is made to deal with them separately as each might operate 
individually to preclude holding company liability. 
1 Failure to Act 
It has been stated in the context of potential holding company liability that the 
tort requires an act rather than a mere omission.89 In LMI Australasia Appeal, 
Hodgson JA suggested that the fact that a holding company could have taken 
steps to prevent its subsidiaries from acting in a certain manner by dismissing 
directors (or threatening to do so) would not form the basis of an action for 
interference with contract.90 
While the distinction between an act and an omission may be clear in extreme 
cases, it is notoriously slippery in others. A holding company might prevent 
performance of a contract by its subsidiary by taking steps to strip it of its 
assets.91 This should amount to a sufficiently positive act by the holding com-
pany to form the basis of liability. On the other hand, a subsidiary may inde-
pendently take on a contractual obligation and, on learning about the obligation, 
the holding company may decide not to inject further funds into the subsidiary. 
In this case it is submitted that there is not a sufficient act of interference. Sitting 
between these two situations are the facts in Stocznia Gdanska, where the 
holding company set the scene for the subsidiary’s financial distress by making 
the subsidiary financially dependent on it92  and then refused to provide the 
funding necessary for performance of the subsidiary’s obligations. 
The court in Stocznia Gdanska saw no reason to preclude the claim against the 
holding company on the basis that there was a mere omission. While the refusal 
to provide funds might be described as a failure to act, it should nevertheless 
amount to a sufficient interference in some cases. What is crucial is that the 
refusal to provide funds was not the only conduct of Latvian Shipping that could 
be causally linked with Latreefers’ failure to perform.93 Latvian Shipping was 
involved in Latreefers’ agreement to the specific contractual obligations and 
 
 89 LMI Australasia Appeal [2003] NSWCA 74 (Unreported, Meagher, Hodgson JJA and 
Young CJ in Eq, 10 April 2003) [11] (Hodgson JA), [101] (Young CJ in Eq). See also Izzo, 
above n 49, 196. 
 90 LMI Australasia Appeal [2003] NSWCA 74 (Unreported, Meagher, Hodgson JJA and 
Young CJ in Eq, 10 April 2003) [11]. 
 91 See, eg, Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Kingswood Motors (Addleston) Ltd [1973] 3 All ER 1057; 
Einhorn v Westmount Investments Ltd (1969) 6 DLR (3d) 71. 
 92 [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 781 (Rix LJ). 
 93 Professors Harold Luntz and David Hambly provide a useful explanation of the distinction 
between a ‘mere omission’ and other failures to act in the context of the tort of negligence. It can 
be said that there is a ‘mere omission’ where, ‘apart from the defendant’s failure to act, there is 
no conduct on the part of the defendant that is causally linked with the plaintiff’s harm’: Harold 
Luntz and David Hambly, Torts: Cases and Commentary (5th ed, 2002) 486. This is contrasted 
with the situation where ‘positive conduct on the part of the defendant is causally responsible for 
the plaintiff’s harm, although an omission in the course of that conduct may also be seen as a 
cause’: at 486. 
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caused Latreefers to take on these obligations while that company was dependent 
on Latvian Shipping for finance. 
It is submitted that in circumstances such as those in Stocznia Gdanska there is 
more than a mere omission and hence holding company liability should be 
possible in an appropriate case. However, there should not be liability in cases 
where the holding company is not involved in the subsidiary entering into the 
relevant contract — even where it knows of its subsidiary’s actions. 
2 Direct and Indirect Interference 
The basic requirement of an interference is complicated by the distinction 
drawn in the cases between a ‘direct’ and an ‘indirect’ interference. There is no 
adequate test that distinguishes between these types of interference.94 An indirect 
interference with the performance of a contract is actionable, but the interference 
must be ‘unlawful’.95 As discussed below, this requirement is difficult to define 
with any precision.96 One explanation for these requirements is that the essence 
of the tort is an intentional and unlawful interference with a contract. It has been 
said that a ‘direct’ interference is in itself unlawful; 97  however, an indirect 
interference is not,98 hence the additional requirement to show that any indirect 
interference is unlawful.99 
Therefore, an initial and important question is whether or not a refusal by a 
holding company to fund a subsidiary’s contractual obligations to pay an amount 
is ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ interference with the contract. In analysing the matter in 
Stocznia Gdanska, the trial judge explored three factual possibilities: 
• the directors of the subsidiary were told by the holding company not to 
perform the subsidiary’s obligations under the contract; 
• the directors of the subsidiary were not told anything by the holding company 
but instead simply were not provided with the funds needed to perform the 
contract; and 
 
 94 Similar and longstanding difficulties are found in the law of trespass. An act is only trespassory 
if it involves a direct interference with the interest that is protected. Therefore, it is often said, 
quite loosely, that trespass can only be committed ‘directly’ rather than ‘indirectly’. However, 
there is little coherent principle in the cases. For instance, it has been held that the release of oil 
from a ship did not amount to a direct interference with land when the tide carried the oil ashore: 
Southport Co v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 182. However, an action did lie where a 
party piled rubbish near another’s land in circumstances where it dried and rolled onto that land: 
Gregory v Piper (1829) 9 B & C 591; 109 ER 220. Of course, the tort of trespass belongs to a 
different ‘family’ of tort to interference with contract (which has its roots in action on the case), 
but the difficulty of distinguishing between direct and indirect interference is common to both. 
 95 D C Thomson & Co Ltd v Deakin [1952] Ch 646; Boral Bricks NSW Pty Ltd v Frost (1987) 20 
IR 70, 79 (Brownie J); Davies v Nyland (1975) 10 SASR 76, 99 (Bray CJ). 
 96 See below Part V(C)(3). 
 97 Australian Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers’ Union v Liquorland (Aust) Pty Ltd 
(2002) 114 IR 165, 180 (Cooper J). 
 98 Davies v Nyland (1975) 10 SASR 76, 98 (Bray CJ). 
 99 This reasoning is uncomfortably circular. For a strong critique of the distinction drawn between 
direct and indirect interference, see A P Simester and Winnie Chan, ‘Inducing Breach of Con-
tract: One Tort or Two?’ (2004) 63 Cambridge Law Journal 132, 164. 
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• the directors of the subsidiary were told that funds were not going to be 
provided in response to the notice that required payment and were instructed 
that the notice was to be ignored.100 
It appears to be accepted in Stocznia Gdanska that only the first of these possi-
bilities would involve a direct interference, suggesting that the starvation of a 
subsidiary of funds alone could only amount to indirect interference.101 How-
ever, it was noted by Rix LJ on appeal that the line between being requested to 
break the contract and being told to do nothing (and not receiving the funds 
necessary to perform) is a narrow one and the distinction is ‘puzzling’. 102 
Despite this, the trial judge’s analysis was not disturbed on appeal.103 In contrast 
with Stocznia Gdanska, there is some case law that suggests that withholding 
finance can amount to a direct interference.104 However, this case law has not 
been accepted in Australia nor does it provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
issue. 
Part of the difficulty in this area is that the case law on the distinction between 
direct and indirect interference generally is far from conclusive. There is no clear 
general statement in the cases of what the distinction is (if such a statement is 
even possible). Some discussions approach the matter by describing what the test 
is not. For instance, in Davies v Nyland, Bray CJ, while making it clear that the 
comments were merely dicta, questioned the correctness of an argument that 
‘identifies the distinction between direct and indirect with the distinction 
between immediate and mediate.’105 To illustrate, Bray CJ posed the following 
question: 
can it be that if A shoots B with a pistol held in his own hand, he has inflicted a 
direct injury, but that if he shoots B by grasping a pistol held in the hand of C 
and pressing C’s finger on the trigger, the injury he has inflicted is only indi-
rect?106 
Perhaps the point being illustrated by Bray CJ is that it is the strength of the 
causal relationship between act and result that determines whether or not there is 
a direct interference — rather than merely whether or not a third party features 
between the actor and the party affected, or whether a number of steps is 
involved. If this is the correct approach it should be noted that in some cases 
refusal to provide funds to a subsidiary may be just as likely to cause a subsidi-
ary to breach its obligations as an instruction to that effect.107 However, it is 
 
100 See Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 537, 574 (Thomas J). 
101 The trial judge found that the third possibility was the most likely and rejected the argument that 
there was direct inducement: ibid 574–7 (Thomas J). On appeal, Rix LJ considered that this third 
possibility lay somewhere between the other two: Stocznia Gdanska [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 
768, 781. 
102 Stocznia Gdanska [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 796. 
103 Ibid 798 (Rix LJ). 
104 See Thermo King Co v Provincial Bank of Canada (1981) 130 DLR (3d) 256. 
105 (1975) 10 SASR 76, 99. 
106 Ibid. 
107 This is because a refusal to provide funds may determine the matter of performance absolutely 
where, as in Stocznia Gdanska, the subsidiary had no other means of raising the funds: [2002] 2 
All ER (Comm) 768, 781 (Rix LJ). However, an instruction by a holding company to a director 
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questionable whether this is (or should be) the correct test, as some case law 
suggests that withholding something that is essential to perform a contract may 
only be indirect interference, despite the certainty of nonperformance in this 
situation.108 
Distinctions drawn in the commentary do not clarify the matter. It is suggested 
in a leading Australian text that: 
Direct interference may be brought about either by words (persuasion or pro-
curement) or by deeds (disabling the person with whom the plaintiff has con-
tracted from continuing with performance of the contract). Indirect interference 
is, in general, occasioned by the defendant’s procurement of others to bring 
about the disablement of the plaintiff’s contract.109 
The generalisations in this quotation are justifiable. It is suggested that the 
authors’ aim was not to set out the test for what is direct or indirect interference 
but rather to illustrate the types of conduct that have been found to be direct or 
indirect. However, the quotation suggests that disabling performance in some 
cases might be direct interference. 
While it is difficult to find clear explanations of the distinction between direct 
and indirect interference, there are clear statements, both in the case law and 
commentary, about the function of the distinction. As is outlined above, the 
distinction is drawn to allow the imposition of the added requirement of ‘unlaw-
fulness’ in some cases. This added requirement can then be relied upon as a 
method of controlling the expansion of an otherwise potentially expansive tort. 
Since the test for ‘directness’ operates as a precondition for any added require-
ment of ‘unlawfulness’, the policy justifications for the tests are intertwined. In 
Torquay Hotel Co Ltd v Cousins, Lord Denning MR described the requirement in 
the commercial context as helping to prevent liability for someone who, through 
lawful means, ‘corners the market’,110 even though in doing so the person knows 
that they might prevent others from performing their contracts.111 Similarly, as 
Peter Cane states, ‘the best justification for the requirement of unlawfulness in 
commercial contexts is to prevent the ordinary use of market power being 
branded illegal, so as to facilitate and preserve the free market.’112 
Clearly such policy issues are relevant in an action between competitors in a 
market.113 However, where the plaintiff and the defendant are not competitors in 
 
of a subsidiary, while persuasive in practice, is subject to the independent exercise of judgement 
by that director. In theory, a holding company might only control that director’s decision through 
the threat of dismissal (or a refusal to re-elect the director). 
108 See D C Thomson & Co Ltd v Deakin [1952] Ch 646, 694 (Jenkins LJ). 
109 Balkin and Davis, above n 1, 642. 
110 [1969] 2 Ch 106, 138. 
111 The justification may vary according to the type of case involved and it is probably worth 
drawing a distinction between ‘commercial’ matters and ‘employment’ matters. See Peter Cane, 
‘Tortious Interference with Contractual Remedies’ (1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 400, where 
the author states that the requirements in the employment context ‘are best explained as the 
common law’s attempt to redress somewhat the imbalance of power between capital and worker 
arising from the former’s ownership of the means of production’: at 403. 
112 Ibid 405. 
113 See, eg, Independent Oil Industries (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 394. 
   
M.U.L.R. — Author — printed 5 March 2007 at 6.48.11 PM — page 79 of 26
  
2006] Sidestepping Limited Liability in Corporate Groups 79 
     
a market the justification is less persuasive. In analysing Law Debenture Trust 
Co v Ural Caspian Oil Co Ltd,114 Cane comments: 
[The defendant] was not engaged in ordinary competitive activity — it was not 
selling goods and services in competition with [the plaintiff] or competing with 
it for limited business. Why should it matter that what it did was not independ-
ently unlawful?115 
While these comments were in the context of a case with quite unique facts116 
they can be applied with equal force to the circumstance in which a contractor 
with a subsidiary brings an action against the holding company for starving the 
subsidiary of funds.117 Perhaps the ‘directness’ and ‘lawfulness’ tests are too 
firmly rooted to suggest that they simply should be ignored in the context of an 
intra-group action. 118  However, it is submitted that when applying the very 
flexible and fuzzy ‘directness’ test there is ample scope to bear in mind that the 
apparent rationale for the test may have little relevance in the corporate group 
context.119 
In summary, Stocznia Gdanska suggests that starving a subsidiary of funds is 
merely indirect interference. However, the case also noted the flexibility of the 
test and it was commented that the defendant had acted in a manner that ‘could 
not have been far from’ direct interference.120 Therefore, it appears that there is 
sufficient uncertainty and flexibility in the test for a future finding that the same 
or similar interference is ‘direct’. Room for such a finding is enhanced by the 
fact that the apparent rationale behind the requirement may not be particularly 
relevant to a claim against a holding company. 
3 Is the Interference Unlawful? 
If it is decided that a holding company has interfered with its subsidiary’s 
contract but only indirectly, it must then be determined whether or not such 
interference was unlawful. Again, this raises problems of definition: what in this 
context is unlawful? 
 
114 [1995] 1 All ER 157. 
115 Cane, above n 111, 405–6. 
116 The case involved an action in tort against a company that was controlled by the same entity that 
controlled another company that had contracted with the plaintiff. It was not a case about starv-
ing a subsidiary of funds. Rather, dealings between several commonly controlled companies 
gave rise to the question of whether it is tortious to deprive intentionally a person of an opportu-
nity to make a claim for interference with contract: Law Debenture Trust Co v Ural Caspian Oil 
Co Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 157. 
117 This ignores the convoluted situation where the defendant holding company was in competition 
with the contractor for the subsidiary’s goods or services. 
118 The High Court in Zhu described the elements of the tort as being ‘well-settled’ in Australian 
law: (2004) 218 CLR 530, 577 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ). For the 
time being, structural changes to the tort in Australia seem unlikely, not least for the reasons 
recently given by Carnwath LJ in OBG Ltd v Allan [2005] QB 762, 799: ‘the boundaries of 
economic torts are a sensitive area in which it is difficult to anticipate the consequences of re-
definition.’ 
119 Additional reasons may exist for keeping a tight rein on the tort in the intra-group context: see 
below Part VI. 
120 Stocznia Gdanska [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 804 (Rix LJ). 
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Some commentators describe this requirement in terms that require the rele-
vant act to be ‘independently unlawful’.121 This highlights one curious aspect of 
the test: the facts that make the interference independently unlawful might have 
little to do with the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant holding 
company. This might lead to liability turning on ‘fictitious and, from a practical 
viewpoint, even irrelevant factors.’122 
In Stocznia Gdanska, Rix LJ analysed what made an unlawful act ‘relevant’. 
There it was decided that the unlawful means must be more than ‘a merely 
incidental or collateral failure’.123 Rix LJ stated that ‘[t]he issue might be put in 
terms of the importance and relevance of the causative nexus between the 
unlawful means in question and the intention to procure the breach of the 
contracts’.124 
The unlawful act (the breach by Latvian Shipping of its agreement with Capco 
to keep Latreefers in funds)125 was found to be relevantly unlawful because 
Rix LJ regarded it as 
impossible to think of the proper financing of Latreefers under the Capco terms 
as an incidental matter, or insufficiently connected with [Latvian Shipping’s] 
intentions towards Latreefers and its contracts with [Stocznia]. Moreover, when 
it came to [Latvian Shipping’s] strategy for dealing with those contracts, it did 
not merely decide to withdraw its financial support for Latreefers: it deliber-
ately used the withdrawal of its financial support as the means to bring about 
the destruction of those contracts …126 
This causation-based approach would be successful in weeding out obviously 
irrelevant factors. For example, it would not be sufficient if the directors of the 
holding company made their decision not to fund the subsidiary during a meeting 
that was held in breach of workplace safety requirements. However, in holding a 
matter to be relevantly unlawful because it provided the intended means of 
interference, the test does not address the fact that the unlawfulness of the means 
may arise from factors that do not flow from the relationship between the 
plaintiff and the defendant holding company.127 
In Stocznia Gdanska the Capco agreement formed part of the retainer of the 
professional service company that provided the Isle of Man directors for the 
subsidiary.128 While the terms of that agreement might be said to be relevant to 
the interests of the plaintiff and the defendant, given they required the subsidiary 
to be kept in funds, presumably the terms were simply insisted upon by the 
service company in order to provide some insulation to the directors against a 
claim for insolvent trading, rather than for the benefit of a creditor. It is unlikely 
 
121 See, eg, Fleming, above n 1, 760 (emphasis added); Cane, above n 111, 405–6 (emphasis added). 
122 Fleming, above n 1, 761. 
123 Stocznia Gdanska [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 802. 
124 Ibid. 
125 See above n 27 and accompanying text. 
126 Stocznia Gdanska [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 802. 
127 In a dissenting judgment in OBG Ltd v Allan [2005] QB 762, 786, Mance LJ appeared to adopt a 
similar (but perhaps broader) test of whether or not the unlawful act had an effect on the relevant 
contracts. 
128 [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 774 (Rix LJ). 
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that Stocznia knew of the agreement, let alone relied upon it, and from the 
perspective of Stocznia the agreement’s existence was merely fortuitous. 
Presumably the result of the case would have been different if Latreefers was 
incorporated in the same jurisdiction as its holding companies and had directors 
from within the corporate group who did not insist upon any form of undertaking 
from the parent companies.129 Thus, with the slightest change of facts — a 
change that might have little to do with the interaction between the plaintiff and 
the defendant — liability might not be found. It is this type of unpredictability 
that has led to the test being described as unsatisfactory.130 
In summary, the test for what is relevantly unlawful is neither clear nor satis-
factory. There is nothing inherently unlawful about refusing to provide finance to 
a subsidiary. Therefore, if it is decided that this can only amount to indirect 
interference, holding company liability for the tort might depend upon finding 
unlawfulness in factors that are only loosely connected with the relationship 
between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
D  Damage 
The final matter that must be shown by a plaintiff is that the defendant’s inter-
ference caused the relevant damage to the plaintiff. It is clear that the tort is not 
actionable per se.131 It was stated recently that ‘in order to complete the cause of 
action there must be special damage, ie more than nominal damage caused to the 
claimant by the breach of contract’.132 If such damage (and the elements above) 
can be shown, the only issue that remains is the defence of justification. 
E  Justification 
A party may interfere with the performance of another’s contract if it is justi-
fied in doing so. The defence of justification has long been recognised as 
applying to the tort and is possibly the only applicable defence.133 In Zhu the 
High Court addressed in detail the matter of what the proper formulation of the 
test of justification should be.134 
The High Court looked to the analysis of Jordan CJ in Independent Oil Indus-
tries.135 This analysis suggests that an interference can only be justified where 
 
129 This appears to have been noted by counsel for Stocznia: see Stocznia Gdanska [2002] 2 All ER 
(Comm) 768, 802 (Rix LJ). 
130 Fleming, above n 1, 761. 
131 Zhu (2004) 218 CLR 530, 584–5 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ); 
Independent Oil Industries (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 394, 414 (Jordan CJ). 
132 Australian Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers’ Union v Liquorland (Aust) Pty Ltd 
(2002) 114 IR 165, 180 (Cooper J), citing Greig v Insole [1978] 3 All ER 449, 484–5 (Slade J). 
133 Independent Oil Industries (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 394, 415 (Jordan CJ). 
134 The appeal to the High Court was argued only on the basis of justification: (2004) 218 CLR 530, 
546 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ). For a description of the facts of the 
case and a general discussion of the decision, see Louise Jarrett and Kanaga Dharmananda, 
‘Interfering with Contracts: Limits on the Justification Defence’ (2005) 33 Australian Business 
Law Review 142. 
135 (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 394. 
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the party that interferes has ‘an actually existing superior legal right’.136 The 
High Court accepted this approach, at least in the application of the tort outside 
the context of employment relationships.137 This left the Court to consider what 
such a ‘superior legal right’ might be. It was decided that a competing contrac-
tual right would not be superior, even where it was prior to the contractual rights 
with which there was interference.138 Instead, it is the nature of the right that 
must be examined to determine its superiority. Relevant superiority is established 
if the right is proprietary in nature or is found in statute.139 A proprietary right 
would be superior because the competing contractual right is at most 
‘quasi-proprietary’.140 
In determining that the test for justification relies upon the finding of some 
form of proprietary right, the High Court also clarified what the test is not. The 
test in Australia does not involve ‘a discretionary “balancing” of social and 
individual interests’.141 This is in contrast with the test in England which looks to 
whether or not the defendant was ‘carrying out a legal, moral or social duty.’142 
The High Court also held that the defence is not made out merely by the defen-
dant demonstrating a desire to further or protect its own interests.143 
Finally, the High Court found that it is not enough merely to have an actually 
existing superior legal right. In order to be justified in interfering, a party must 
be doing no more than is reasonably necessary to protect that right.144 This 
 
136 Ibid 416. 
137 Zhu (2004) 218 CLR 530, 579–80 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ). The 
High Court found it unnecessary to consider whether the test would also apply in the employ-
ment context. 
138 Ibid 587 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
139 Ibid 582 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
140 Ibid 580 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ). The High Court here was 
making reference to the notion of ‘quasi-proprietary’ rights that was explored by Kitto J in 
A-G (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1952) 85 CLR 237, 294–5. The High Court acknowl-
edged that such a distinction is not clear and  
seems to rest on the view that proprietary rights are stronger than quasi-proprietary rights in 
that while the former are marked by a combination of characteristics like alienability of bene-
fit and burden and a right to exclusive possession or use enforceable against the world … 
quasi-proprietary rights do not have the totality of those characteristics. 
Zhu (2004) 218 CLR 530, 573 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
141 Zhu (2004) 218 CLR 530, 570–1 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
142 Howarth, above n 49, 195. In Stocznia Gdanska the Court of Appeal stated that the law on 
justification in England ‘has not been clearly worked out’ and referred only generally to the 
possibility that ‘moral or perhaps economic factors’ may mitigate actions to the point of remov-
ing liability: [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 804 (Rix LJ). David Howarth argues in favour of a 
similarly unstructured but broader approach based on whether or not the interference was ‘fair, 
just and reasonable’: Howarth, above n 49, 225, 232. A somewhat similar argument was rejected 
in Zhu, where the defendant argued unsuccessfully for the defence to be based on whether the 
relevant conduct was done ‘without just cause or excuse’: (2004) 218 CLR 530, 566 
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ). For an earlier critical analysis of the 
English position, see generally Richard O’Dair, ‘Justifying an Interference with Contractual 
Rights’ (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 227. 
143 Zhu (2004) 218 CLR 530, 571 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ). Contrast 
this with the approach in the United States where it appears that the justification defence may be 
available to a holding company on the basis that it should be permitted to protect its financial 
interest in its subsidiary: Izzo, above n 49, 196. 
144 Zhu (2004) 218 CLR 530, 587–8 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
Again, the High Court drew upon the reasoning of Jordan CJ in Independent Oil Industries 
(1937) 37 SR (NSW) 394, 415. 
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involves contemplation of ‘how a reasonable and prudent person or body in … 
[the defendant’s] position would have behaved’.145 
Reliance on concepts of property has some interesting consequences in the 
context of an action against a holding company. As a starting point it must be 
recognised that the holding company will have some proprietary rights through 
its shares in the subsidiary. 146  However, it is submitted that this is not the 
appropriate right with which to undertake a comparison with the third party 
contractor’s rights. 
The rights held in the shares of the subsidiary cannot be said to be rights that 
compete directly with the third party’s right to performance. While the perform-
ance of the subsidiary’s contract might affect the value of the holding company’s 
property, it will not ordinarily interfere with the holding or enjoyment of that 
property. Besides, if the shares in the subsidiary amounted to the necessary 
proprietary interest, prima facie the defence would always be available to a 
holding company (subject to whether the interference is reasonably necessary). 
This result is difficult to support. It is submitted that the more appropriate 
approach is to look for proprietary rights of the holding company that compete 
more directly with those of the plaintiff contractor, such as rights, if any, in the 
subject matter of the subsidiary’s contract.147 
The fact that a holding company generally has no proprietary interest in the 
property of its subsidiary148 then forms a natural impediment to the availability 
of the defence. Further, there is no general statutory provision that gives a 
holding company the right to interfere with the performance of its subsidiary’s 
contracts. 
In summary, the High Court’s formulation of the justification defence in 
non-employment cases is significant for a number of reasons including: 
• the fact that it demonstrates divergence from the English approach, which is 
based on a broader enquiry into the merits of the interference; and 
• the apparent difficulties that will arise for holding companies seeking to use 
the defence in the context contemplated in this article, because the separate 
legal entity principle will tend to prevent the holding of the required rights.149 
 
145 Zhu (2004) 218 CLR 530, 588 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
146 Indeed, in its analysis of the defence of justification in Zhu the High Court made reference to the 
rights of an owner of a share being proprietary rather than quasi-proprietary: ibid 573 
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
147 For example, such rights might arise from security interests held by a holding company over 
assets that are affected by the contract. 
148 Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619, 626–7 (Lord Buckmaster). 
149 It is interesting to contemplate here the fact that the corporate veil might work in some small 
way towards holding company liability rather than in its more familiar role in preventing such 
liability. 
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VI  THE BREADTH OF THE APPLICATION OF  THE TORT IN  THE 
CORPORATE GROUP CONTEXT 
The exploration above reveals that the elements of the tort contain significant 
flexibility. It also reveals that there is uncertainty in the application of the tort to 
a holding company that starves its subsidiary of funds. In particular: 
• there is uncertainty about when a failure to fund a subsidiary would amount 
to a sufficiently positive act to be an interference; 
• there is significant malleability in the test for whether the interference is 
direct and, despite Stocznia Gdanska, there is scope for a future finding that 
the ‘starving’ of a subsidiary by a holding company is a direct interference 
with its subsidiary’s contracts; and 
• determining what is relevantly unlawful in a given case may depend upon 
unpredictable factors that are not immediately relevant to the dealings be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant. 
This flexibility is such that in Australia there is potential for the application of 
the tort in circumstances similar to Stocznia Gdanska, or even beyond, without 
the need to modify any of the elements of the tort. As was acknowledged in 
Stocznia Gdanska, the flexibility of these elements may be a strength. Comment-
ing on the elements, Rix LJ stated: 
These considerations are designed to keep a wide-ranging tort within bounds. It 
is therefore important that they are not applied mechanically and that regard is 
had to the balancing demands of moral constraint and economic freedom. For 
these purposes the concepts of knowledge and intention, direct participation, 
the causative relevance of unlawful means, and the possibilities of justification, 
are presumably sufficiently flexible to enable the principles of the tort to pro-
duce the right result.150 
The question then arises: should this flexibility be used to expand the scope of 
the application of the tort to holding companies that starve their subsidiaries of 
funds? Or has Stocznia Gdanska already travelled too far down this path? In 
addressing these questions it is appropriate to consider the general demands that 
need to be balanced. 
On the most basic level, the tort reflects the sentiment that ‘contracts should be 
kept rather than broken.’151  However, balanced against this should be the 
knowledge that the expansion of the tort could act to ‘undermine the distribution 
of benefits and burdens established by another area of law.’152 In particular, the 
application of the tort to a holding company could have the practical effect of 
 
150 [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 804. Although it should be noted that Zhu (2004) 218 CLR 530 
sets down a less flexible framework for the defence of justification in Australia. 
151 Stocznia Gdanska [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 803 (Rix LJ). However, note Howarth’s claims 
that justifications of the tort based on such arguments are built on ‘flawed assumptions’: How-
arth, above n 49, 207. 
152 Howarth, above n 49, 227. See also Izzo, above n 49, 197. As Peter Gibson LJ notes in 
Millar v Bassey [1994] EMLR 44, 64, one significant concern is that the expansion of the tort 
may undermine the rule of privity of contract: see discussion of this case in Stocznia Gdanska 
[2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 803 (Rix LJ). 
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eroding the limited liability of the holding company. This concern, rather than 
concerns about impeding ordinary competition, should be primary when 
considering the application of the tort to holding companies. 
Finding the point at which the principle of limited liability should yield to 
other pressures is difficult. Few coherent principles have developed in the 
doctrine on lifting the veil.153 It has been argued with force that many of the 
justifications for limited liability are of limited relevance when applied to 
constituent companies of corporate groups, particularly in wholly owned 
structures.154 A particular justification that may survive in the corporate group 
context is one of the original and most significant arguments in favour of limited 
liability: that it will encourage economic activity through risk-taking ventures 
that otherwise might not be undertaken. 155  This complicates the balancing 
exercise for two main reasons. First, it raises the prospect that one must attempt 
to balance broad arguments in favour of promoting economic activity generally 
against the fairness of a dealing to an individual party affected by the corporation 
or against the culpability of an individual party adopting the device of incorpora-
tion.156 Second, a related problem is that there is not yet any convincing way of 
measuring the economic benefits to society of maintaining limited liability 
between a holding company and its subsidiary. 
Despite these difficulties, it has been suggested that limited liability should 
yield where there has been undercapitalisation of a subsidiary.157 While such 
undercapitalisation may be relevant to the finding of agency using the formula-
tion in Smith, Stone & Knight,158 in the United States it appears to take on a more 
significant role in the ‘veil lifting’ cases, 159  particularly in cases involving 
 
153 In a widely quoted passage, Rogers AJA stated ‘there is no common, unifying principle, which 
underlies the occasional decision of courts to pierce the corporate veil.’: Briggs v James Hardie 
& Co Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 549, 567. 
154 Phillip I Blumberg, ‘Limited Liability and Corporate Groups’ (1986) 11 Journal of Corporation 
Law 573, 623–6; Ian M Ramsay, ‘Holding Company Liability for the Debts of an Insolvent 
Subsidiary: A Law and Economics Perspective’ (1994) 17 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 520, 536–7. 
155 Phillip I Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law: The Search for a New 
Corporate Personality (1993) 125. Interestingly, the arguments about risk-taking have common 
roots with policy concerns about preventing the tort from restricting competition. Ultimately, 
both are based on a desire to avoid stifling economic activity. 
156 The point is illustrated dramatically (in the context of tort liability) by contemplating the facts of 
Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 549, 557 (Rogers AJA). How could it 
be explained to the survivors of Mr Briggs — an illiterate, negligently killed employee of an 
asbestos mining business — that his death should not be compensated because to do so would 
offend the principle of limited liability and potentially hamper economic activity? 
157 Blumberg, Multinational Challenge, above n 155, 86; John Farrar, Corporate Governance in 
Australia & New Zealand (2001) 251. 
158 [1939] 4 All ER 116, 121 (Atkinson J). 
159 Phillip I Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Tort, Contract, and Other Common Law 
Problems in the Substantive Law of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (1987) 465–6. For a 
useful summary of the law based on Professor Blumberg’s work, see Ian Ramsay’s memoran-
dum in the Submission to Special Commission of Inquiry into the Medical Research and Com-
pensation Foundation, 14 July 2004, attachment A (The Medical Research and Compensation 
Foundation, MRCF (Investments) Pty Ltd, Amaca Pty Ltd and Amaba Pty Ltd). 
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contractual obligations rather than tortious liability.160 In such cases the failure to 
provide adequate capital for a subsidiary corporation to carry on its intended 
business161 may alone allow the court to lift the corporate veil.162 However, the 
matter is far from settled.163 Interestingly, the undercapitalisation itself may not 
be the ultimate justification for removal of limited liability in these cases. Rather, 
undercapitalisation may be seen as a form of misleading conduct towards 
creditors.164 Therefore, a creditor who has contracted with an undercapitalised 
subsidiary knowing of its financial vulnerability might find it difficult to argue 
for lifting the veil. 165  To adapt the words of Lord Macnaghten in Salo-
mon v Salomon & Co Ltd, provided such creditors are voluntary they have 
nobody to blame but themselves for their misfortunes.166 
In this regard the plaintiff in Stocznia Gdanska did not start from the highest 
moral ground. The plaintiff negotiated for a significant contract with a company 
of apparent substance, yet allowed the arrangement to proceed with a newly 
formed subsidiary without seeking a guarantee from the holding company.167 
Despite the fact that the defendant holding company also was not without blame 
(having acted upon an intention to interfere with a contract) it is questionable 
whether limited liability should give way in such a case when the plaintiff was 
not misled and had clear options available to protect itself. 168  If anything, 
Stocznia was in a better position to protect its interests than the unsophisticated 
trade creditors of Salomon & Co Ltd. 
It is submitted that, from a policy perspective, Stocznia Gdanska is not the 
most deserving case in which to ‘sidestep’ the corporate veil (which may 
potentially reduce desirable risk-taking economic activity). Any application of 
Stocznia Gdanska in Australia in the corporate group context should be done 
 
160 Blumberg, Tort, Contract and Other Common Law Problems, above n 159, 225, 465. A strong 
theme in Professor Blumberg’s writing is that the mixing of jurisprudence on lifting the veil in 
contract matters and tort matters is ‘unacceptable’: at 108–9. 
161 The emphasis in the cases is on the initial capitalisation of the corporation. The depletion of a 
subsidiary’s capital through ordinary business transactions (in contrast with deliberate asset 
stripping) is not as persuasive a factor in favour of lifting the veil between holding company and 
subsidiary: see Lynn M LoPucki, ‘The Death of Liability’ (1996) 106 Yale Law Journal 1, 22–3; 
Blumberg, Tort, Contract and Other Common Law Problems, above n 159, 470–2. 
162 Blumberg, Tort, Contract and Other Common Law Problems, above n 159, 465–6. 
163 See LoPucki, above n 161, 22–3. See also Phillip I Blumberg and Jonathan Fowler, The Law of 
Corporate Groups: Problems in the Bankruptcy or Reorganization of Parent and Subsidiary 
Corporations, Including the Law of Corporate Guaranties — 1992 Supplement (1992) 264–8 for 
a discussion of a number of bankruptcy cases in the United States where it was found that un-
dercapitalisation must be accompanied by another factor such as fraud in order to justify lifting 
the veil between holding company and subsidiary. 
164 Blumberg, Tort, Contract and Other Common Law Problems, above n 159, 472. 
165 Ibid. 
166 [1897] AC 22, 53. 
167 In this manner, the position of a typical contract creditor can be contrasted with the more 
vulnerable tort victim, who will normally have no chance to consider the financial substance of 
the tortfeasor before becoming a contingent creditor: see Hansmann and Kraakman, above n 9, 
1919–20; Blumberg, Multinational Challenge, above n 155, 135–6. 
168 See Phillip I Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Problems in the Bankruptcy or 
Reorganization of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, Including the Law of Corporate Guar-
anties (1985) 599, where Professor Blumberg states that the refusal to lift the corporate veil ‘is 
obviously sound where creditors have bargained for the credit of a particular component of a 
group without reliance on the credit of other components of the group.’ 
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cautiously. The mere fact of undercapitalisation should not be enough to justify 
the effective removal of limited liability in such cases, particularly where the 
creditor had reason to suspect the undercapitalisation. As a tentative starting 
point, the tort should not be allowed to expand beyond the Stocznia Gdanska 
situation unless the contract creditor is vulnerable in the sense that it had no 
practical opportunity to manage its credit risk.169 It is not suggested that vulner-
ability of the plaintiff should be another formal element or requirement of the 
tort. However, in utilising the flexibility of the elements of the tort to get the 
‘right result’170 the vulnerability of the plaintiff is a relevant policy considera-
tion. Where the plaintiff is a large, sophisticated contract creditor, the defendant’s 
behaviour should be particularly blameworthy before this should be allowed to 
outweigh the longstanding argument that limited liability brings broader eco-
nomic benefits, at least until there is clearer evidence that such benefits are 
illusory. 
VII   CONCLUSION 
The tort of interference with contract could provide a useful remedy against a 
solvent holding company as an alternative to a hollow remedy in contract against 
an insolvent subsidiary. As illustrated by Stocznia Gdanska, the tort may apply 
where a holding company starves its subsidiary of funds. The scope of the tort in 
this context (and generally) is uncertain because of the malleability of its 
elements. This flexibility could allow the tort to expand significantly as a 
remedy against holding companies. However, any such expansion should be 
cautious and its effect on limited liability should be acknowledged. It is particu-
larly difficult to justify an expanded application of the tort as a means of 
sidestepping limited liability where the contracting party had the ability and 
opportunity to protect its own interests through means such as a parent company 
guarantee. 
 
169 For a discussion of contract creditors who might be vulnerable in this sense, see Blumberg, 
Multinational Challenge, above n 155, 136–7. Professor Blumberg suggests that the practical 
opportunity to bargain over credit typically is missing in ‘employment contracts, retail consumer 
purchases, and in small trade contracts’: at 137. 
170 Stocznia Gdanska [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 768, 804 (Rix LJ). 
